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Abstract 
Background: 
Wuhan, China was the original epicenter of COVID-19 pandemic.  The goal of the current study 
is to understand the infection transmission dynamics before intervention measures were taken, 
such as issuing a lockdown for the city and other social distancing policies.  
Methods: 
Data and key events were searched through pubmed for medical literature and internet for 
Chinese government announcements and Chinese media reports. Epidemiological data including 
R0 and infection were calculated using data extracted from variety of data sources. 
Results: 
We established a timeline emphasizing evidence of human-to-human transmission. By January 1, 
2020, Chinese authorities had been presented convincing evidence of human-to-human 
transmission; however, it was until January 20, 2020 that this information was shared with the 
public. Our study estimated that there would have been 10,989 total infected cases if 
interventions were taken on January 2, 2020, vs 239,875 cases when lockdown was put in place 
on January 23, 2020.   
Conclusions: 
China’s withholding of key information about the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and its delayed 
response ultimately led to the largest public health crisis of this century and could have been 
avoided with earlier countermeasures.  
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Introduction  
The COVID-19 outbreak that originated from Wuhan, a major transportation hub of 
China, had caused more than eight million confirmed cases and 444,563 deaths in the world as of 
June 17, 2020 [1]. Multiple countries reported having their first cases imported from Wuhan or 
by a returning visitor to Wuhan [2-7]. Thus, it is important to understand the infection 
transmission dynamics within the epicenter where the virus first originated, especially before 
intervention measures were taken such as issuing a lockdown of the city and other social 
distancing policies. In spite of the worldwide interest in understanding the initial phase of the 
pandemic in Wuhan, researchers’ efforts have been hampered by lack of transparency including 
the lack of comprehensive and reliable data from this period.   
By the time of the lockdown on January 23,2020, the Chinese official report for the 
COVID infection in Wuhan is 495 cases. However, media reports from China suggest that the 
official confirmed cases in Wuhan before and around the lockdown were significantly 
underreported. This under-reporting seems to be due to multiple factors, such as limitation of 
testing and surveillance capability [8,9]; limited quantity of test kits provided to local hospitals 
[10] and generally low testing accuracy (low sensitivity, 30-60%) [11]. More importantly, 
government policies and intervention, such as the different versions of diagnostic criteria, seem 
to have a heavy influence on the information sharing and preparation for the pandemic [12]. 
The current study investigates the early outbreak through search and screening into 
various types information, including interviews with those who were in direct contact with 
patients, Chinese media reports and government reports.  We found that the key information of 
human to human transmission had not been reported by the Chinese government for at least three 
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weeks, despite convincing evidence. We provide our estimates of the impact of this delay of 
three weeks and other epidemiological parameters related to COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, 
before the lockdown and other public quarantine measures on January 23, 2020. 
Methods  
Data Collection 
In an effort to reconstruct what happened before and during the lockdown in Wuhan, we 
screened media reports published in mainland China from January to April 2020, covering the 
details about various events and measures taken by local hospitals and government on various 
levels concerning the Wuhan lockdown.  We have complied the epidemic relevant events into a 
timeline so that the scientific community will have information that can potentially impact 
understanding the dynamics of the COVID-19 virus in Wuhan, China. 
We searched and profiled data through the following different information channels.  
1). Pubmed search using keyword “COVID-19”. Search results were screened for daily incidence 
by PCR diagnosis from admitted patients. Two references were found [13, 14]. [Appendix A, 
column B]. 
2). Screening of published Chinese media reports with recounts from local physicians and 
hospitals. Search results were screened for daily and total hospitalization cases including the 
PCR confirmed cases and patients with high suspicion of COVID infection with severe 
symptoms. We found the following Chinese media reports and government announcements [15-
19] [Appendix A, column C]. 
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3). Daily new incidences with a typical pattern of COVID infection on CT images with features 
strongly correlated to the known COVID pattern in two radiology departments in two hospitals 
in Wuhan from media reports [9] [Appendix A, column H]. 
Data Classifications 
We have created three data categories for our calculations: 
A: Hospitalized patients with COVID infection confirmed by PCR in Wuhan citywide. 
B: Hospitalized patients due to COVID infection in Wuhan citywide (including highly suspicious 
clinical cases not yet confirmed by PCR or local diagnosis criteria).   
C: Daily symptomatic incidences based on daily cases with COVID patterns identified by 
radiologists from CT reading rooms from two similarly sized Grade III Level A (tertiary) 
hospitals.  
Results  
I. Timeline of COVID-19 Outbreak Before Lockdown and Chinese Government’s 
Reaction 
A brief timeline of COVID-19 outbreak, focusing on features of human-to-human 
transmission, before Wuhan lockdown on January 23, 2020, is listed in Figure 1 [20, 21] (for a 
more comprehensive timeline and its references, see Appendix B).  
I.I Patients in family clusters suggestive of human to human transmission 
On December 27, 2019, an elderly couple presenting with fever and dyspnea was 
admitted to Wuhan Xinhua Hospital ICU.  On the next day, the son of this couple was called to 
Xinhua Hospital. The CT imaging of all three in the family showed similar findings. This family 
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cluster demonstrated an obvious clue of “human to human transmission.” ICU chief, Dr. Zhang 
Jixian reported these three cases to the hospital leadership. On December 29, the vice president 
of the Xinhua Hospital, Dr. Xia Wenguang called for a clinical conference on seven similar 
cases, including this family cluster of three. On the same day, Dr. Xia reported to the City and 
Provincial Health Commissions and CDCs. He asked for starting emergency protocol activation. 
On December 29, 2019, the ER in Wuhan Central Hospital reported four similar cases to 
the Hospital Public Health Office, which reported to local county CDC. Among these patients, 
there was a pair of mother-son, another example of human-to-human transmission.  
On 12/30/2019, one physician in Xinhua Hospital reported symptoms. This was 
confirmed on Jan 11, and she is the 2nd case of a medical staff infected in Xinhua Hospital. 
I.II.  Next-generation sequencing (NGS) of airway samples suggestive of SARS-like 
coronavirus 
On December 27.2019, the NGS result of patient A was orally reported back to Central 
Hospital by Vision Medicals (Guangzhou, China) by phone, it was claimed to be a coronavirus 
that is “Bat SARS like”. The sequencing results of patient A were forwarded to Wuhan Institute 
of Virology (WIV), and WIV confirmed the high similarity to SARS-like coronavirus from bat. 
On December 30, 2019, Beijing CapitalBio MedLab (北京博奥医学检验所) reported 
sequencing results of patient Chen 2 as “highly suspicious for SARS” to the Central Hospital. 
Dr. Ai Fen, ER Chief in Central Hospital, reported sequencing results to Hospital Public Health 
Office and Hospital Infectious Disease Department. She also forwarded the report to ER doctor’s 
Wechat, which triggered a chain of events spreading the warning, including message sent out by 
Dr. Li Wenliang. On January 1, 2020, BGI group (Huada Gene) reported sequencing results of 3 
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cases of pneumonia in Wuhan which harbored viral genome sequences showing 80% similarity 
to SARS virus to Wuhan City Health Commission. 
I.III. Non-acknowledgement of human-to-human transmission and intervention in case 
reporting 
As Table 1 demonstrates, by December 30, 2019, there had been convincing evidence of 
human-to-human transmission, including clinical presentation of patient clusters and viral 
sequencing results. Despite this, on December 30,2019, the Wuhan City Health Commission 
issued two emergency policies, the 2nd one stating that “no one or institution is allowed to 
disclose information about the pneumonia (of unknown etiology) without authorization.” On 
December 31, 2019, the Wuhan City Health Commission announced that recent pneumonia cases 
seen in some hospitals were related to the Wet Market; no obvious findings of “human to human 
transmission” and no infection of medical staff.  
On December 31, 2019, the Chinese National Health Commission dispatched a panel of 
experts to Wuhan for investigation.  After visiting Wuhan, they announced no evidence of 
“human to human transmission” on January 10, 2020.  It was not until January 20, 2020 that the 
National Health Commission announced the human to human transmission by COVID-19. Three 
weeks passed from the emerging evidence of human-to-human transmission.  
During this period, Chinese physicians sensed the risk of outbreaks and reported 
promptly; Chinese researchers also cultured and isolated the virus and obtained the viral genome 
sequence. On the other hand, while the Chinese government started to communicate with 
international organizations, the severity was under-reported and “human to human transmission” 
was denied. Other counterproductive measures taken by the Chinese government included, but 
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were not limited to, prohibiting medical staff from releasing information to public, prohibiting 
discussions among medical staff on the “pneumonia of unknown etiology”, prohibiting staff 
from wearing PPE (personal protection equipment), prohibiting 3rd party labs from doing viral 
sequencing, making diagnostic criteria difficult for diagnosis confirmation, deleting reported 
cases, disciplinary action against “whistle blowers” and closure of the lab which shared viral 
genome information with the international community.  
Wuhan local and the Chinese National CDC has implemented at least seven different 
versions of diagnosis criteria since the outbreak, thus making it hard to identify and understand 
the infection number in a consistent manner [12]. If taking infection with mild or no symptoms 
into account, a study estimated that 86% of infected individuals were not documented in China 
before January 23, 2020 [22]. Policies and interventions for reporting (holding cases for 12 days) 
made the confirmed cases artificially low, as reported by mainland Chinese media [15,16, 23].  
I.IV.  Reaction of Taiwan and Hong Kong governments 
By comparison, the Hong Kong and Taiwan governments were closely monitoring and 
preparing for the coming epidemic during this critical time. On December 31, 2019, Taiwan 
inquired of China and the WHO for details about the “Atypical Pneumonia patients quarantined” 
with a strong suspicion of human to human transmission. Taiwan started border infections 
screening on direct flights from Wuhan to Taiwan. On December 31, 2019, Hong Kong media 
reported the presence of “new SARS” in Wuhan. The Taiwan and Hong Kong governments had 
press conference almost daily on the epidemic.  
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II. Estimation of Epidemic in Wuhan 
II.I.  Calculation of R0 
Assuming the ratio of symptomatic cases in the total infected population is constant, and 
the proportion of symptomatic patients seeking medical help remains constant over the time, we 
use the growth rate of hospitalized people, PCR test positives or CT positives in our dataset as 
the proxy for the growth rate of the infected population.  
R0 represents the average number of secondary cases that result from the introduction of a 
single infectious case in a totally susceptible population during the infectious period. Wallinga 
and Lipsitch have pointed out that the exponential growth rate (r) during the early phase of the 
outbreak can be used to calculate the R0 by using the formula R0 = 1/M(-r), where M is the 
moment generating functions of the serial interval (SI) distribution of the disease [24] .  
We assumed a gamma distribution for the serial interval, with 7.5 as the mean and 3.4 as 
standard deviation, based on a prior study of Wuhan data of the initial epidemic stage [13]. R 
package “R0” is used to provide estimates of the R0 and its 95% confidence interval [25].  
In the Feb. 3 speech, Chinese President Xi told China’s most powerful leaders that he had 
“continuously given verbal and written instructions” since Jan 7, and he had personally ordered 
the quarantine of about 60 million people in Hubei province later in January. We found PCR 
reported cases decreased after January 9, 2020, while no countermeasure had been taken by then.  
The decrease in reporting could well be driven by political reasons. Thus, we utilize (dataset A) 
PCR results from December 1, 2019 to January 8, 2020 (the growing portion which is less 
subject to political intervention) [Figure 2], R0 is estimated to be 3.12, with 95% confidence 
interval as (2.69, 3.64) [Table 2].  
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 Patients without symptoms are highly unlikely to be tested for COVID in Wuhan, they 
will get CT scans only if they have symptoms that are either severe or causing respiratory 
distress; thus, the CT rooms readings provide samples with severe symptoms.  The CT data (data 
set C) fit well with a Poisson log linear regression model for the daily new incidence.  The 
coefficient of the Poisson model is 0.179 (0.151, 0.207), which implies 3.565 doubling time and 
higher R0 than the PCR based R0.  However, due to the limited size of this dataset, this study will 
mainly use the PCR based R0 for estimation. 
 Based on field observation, around 60,000 more people visited febrile clinics in Wuhan 
from January 22 to January 27, 2020 with symptoms, and 3,883 were observed at clinics who 
could not be admitted due to lack of beds [Appendix A, column I]. Chinese media reported that 
shortage of hospital beds wasn’t eased until February 15, 2020.  The growth of the hospitalized 
population was subject to the capability of Wuhan for adding beds dedicated to COVID patients.  
Thus, we are not going to use the daily incremental hospitalization for the R0 estimation, since it 
could likely produce an underestimate.   
II.II.  Estimate of incidence in Wuhan based on the SEIR model  
Susceptible–exposed–infectious–removed (SEIR) model is applied to estimate the 
incidences. The following epidemiologic parameters are assumed in the estimation [13]. 
1. December 1, 2019 as the initial outbreak time, January 23, 2020 is the 54th day. 
2. 5.2 days as the mean incubation duration 
3. 2.3 days as the mean infection duration 
4. 11.5 days as the median time from initial hospital admittance to discharge [26]  
5. 2% case fatality rate (Chinese official figure of the early stage in Wuhan) 
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6. 14 million population in Wuhan before lockdown [27]  
With the estimated 3.12 R0 based on the PCR results and the SEIR model, it is estimated 
that by January 23, 2020, Wuhan had 239,875 infected people, among them 149,170 were in the 
stage of incubation and were infectious.  The new daily latent and infectious cases are estimated 
to be 23,774, 7,148 respectively on January 23, 2020. [Figures 3A] 
II.III.  Hospital admission rate: government official report vs estimation 
The Chinese official report for Wuhan suggested a 100% admission rate for COVID 
patients diagnosed in Wuhan, China [28]. However, it was very hard to secure a bed around the 
lockdown period in Wuhan, and many residents were told to go back home and self-quarantine 
[29].  By December 31, 2019, the officially reported admitted number is 46, our analysis 
estimates a total of 333 (105, 1,219) infectious cases by then, which implies 13% admission rate 
(46/333). On January 20, 2020, it was reported the 2,000 beds dedicated to COVID were all 
occupied, we estimated 14,804 (2,485,104,298) infectious cases cumulated, and a 13.5% 
admission rate.   The above hospital admission ratio was based on the estimates of infectious 
cases, many infected but no longer infectious cases needed medical care as well. 
III.  Estimation of Impacts of the Delay of the Three Weeks 
 The period of the three weeks before the lockdown was a crucial time in the early stage 
of the epidemic.  If countermeasures would have been taken on January 2, 2020, immediately 
after the authorities were informed about the human-to-human transmission, the epidemic 
development would have taken a completely different trajectory.  If we assume the intervention 
reduces the daily contacts of the infectious by 2/3, our study estimated that there would have 
been 10,989 total infected cases, vs 239,875 cases when lockdown was taken place on Jan 23, 
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2020.  The group of people with infectivity (infectious+ latent) would be reduced from 149,170 
to 1,916, and the daily new cases of the infectible group would be reduced from 30,922 to 10 on 
January 23, 2020 [Table 3] [Figure 3B].   This demonstrates that if countermeasures would have 
been taken three weeks earlier, the epidemic would have been largely contained by January 23, 
2020. 
By the time the authorities locked down Wuhan, about five million people (about 5/14 of 
the total Wuhan population) had left Wuhan, resulting in a potential outflow of 41,008 exposed 
cases and 12,267 infectious cases, contributing directly to one of the most serious public health 
crises of this century. 
The above estimations assume the intervention reduces the daily contacts of the 
infectious by 2/3.  After the long delay, Wuhan took a drastic lockdown measure to contain the 
virus spread, which reduced the daily contacts of the infectious by more than 2/3.  If a strict 
intervention would have been applied on January 2, 2020, we would have seen an even larger 
decline in the epidemic spread. 
Discussion 
Potential impact of the delay of the critical three weeks  
Some other scholars have done hypothetical studies of countermeasures.  As Yang et al. 
suggested, using a modified SEIR and AI prediction of the epidemic trend of COVID-19 in 
China, “If the introduction of interventions was delayed by five days, the transmission 
coefficient would have been much greater due to the increase in the average number of contacts 
with an infected person daily.” They also pointed out that a five-day delay in implementation 
would have increased the epidemic size in mainland China three-fold [30]. Lai S and associates 
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pointed out that if interventions in China could have been conducted one week, two weeks, or 
three weeks earlier, cases could have been dramatically reduced by 66% (IQR 50% - 82%), 86% 
(81% - 90%), or 95% (93% - 97%), respectively [31].  
Our study has demonstrated that the delay was real, there is 21 day interval between 
December 31 and January 20 when China acknowledged the human to human transmission, and 
24 days to January 23 when lockdown took place.  The experience of Hong Kong and Taiwan 
has shown that the infection can be contained if actions are taken promptly [32,33].  
 Based on our media report screening, we did not identify any public quarantine measure 
taken by the government in Wuhan before January 23, 2020.  Instead, communities were 
encouraged to continue hosting large scale gatherings to celebrate the lunar New Year. On 
January 18, 2020, over 40 thousand families attended the Ten Thousand Families Banquet at the 
Baibuting Community, none of the attendees wore masks.  Three days before this event, some 
organizers asked to cancel the banquet, but the request was not approved [34].  In the meantime, 
the authorities took steps to underreport the incidence and infectivity of COVID-19 to China and 
the world.   
Emigration and estimation 
In this study, we did not incorporate the dynamics of the population in Wuhan.  About 
five million people left Wuhan before the lockdown, with a large portion happening during the 
week before Chinese New Year’s Day (January 25, 2020).  The infected among this emigrant 
group got in contact with population outside Wuhan, making the susceptible number larger.  
Also, the higher frequency of interpersonal contacts of these emigrants before the Chinese New 
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Year’s Day will result in a higher R0.  Hence, the estimation of the infected presented in this 
paper is likely to be an underestimate. 
The start date of the outbreak 
In this study, we assumed the outbreak first took place on December 1, 2019.  Some 
studies suggest an earlier date. However, Ma J reported that according to China’s internal 
government’s data, the first case of COVID-19 confirmed case could be traced back to 
November 17, 2019 [35]. The Epidemiology Working Group for NCIP Epidemic Response and 
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, retrospectively reported 104 cases by 
December31, 2019 based on data extracted from China's Infectious Disease Information System 
[36]. On September 18, 2019, Chinese media reported a drill by Wuhan Customs, including a 
case scenario of “novel coronavirus infection” [37]. The above information suggests possibilities 
that are not known to public.  
R0 estimation and modeling  
The epidemiological parameters are important for estimating the potential impact of the 
at least three-weeks delay in response by Chinese government. R0 for Wuhan has been studied by 
other groups. Li Q et al. from the Chinese CDC and other institutions studied the Wuhan 
epidemic curve up to January 4, 2020, with estimation of R0 as 2.2 [13]. Zhao S et al. applied an 
exponential growth model, adjusted report rate of the Chinese official data, and estimated the R0 
to be between 2.24 to 3.58 [38]. A study by Sanche S and associates looked into Wuhan travelers 
who were confirmed infected in other provinces and estimated the Wuhan outbreak had a R0 of 
5.7 (3.8–8.9) [26]. Hou J et al estimated the R0 in Wuhan to be 4.90 during the local epidemic 
period from December 1, 2019 to January 9, 2020, and 3.00 during the long-distance spread 
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period due to the Spring Festival travel rush from January 10 to 22 [39]. Read JM et a.l estimated 
that only 5.1% of infections in Wuhan's early outbreak were identified, and R0 as 3.11 between 
January 1 to January 21 [40]. Wu JT et al studied cases exported from Wuhan to other cities 
outside of Mainland China using modelling and estimated R0 to be  2.68 [41].   
Despite our efforts to extract clinical operation-related data from various types of reports, 
the data we have collected are still fragmented and largely incomplete due to the lack of 
transparency in China.  Nevertheless, our PCR based R0 estimate 3.12 with 95% C.I (2.69, 3.64) 
is compatible with the previous studies.  As shown in table 5, if the actual R0 is higher than 3.12, 
the case reduction brought by intervention will be more significant; if the actual R0 is lower, the 
epidemic would have been contained by January 23, 2020. 
Wuhan is not a homogenous city, the SEIR model at most can be used to give a crude 
oversimplified mathematical modelling of real-life events and estimates of the magnitude of 
infection. Given the nature of MCMC methods, the samples/incidences generated in our case 
best serve as a rough estimate of the size of the Wuhan epidemic and indicator of discrepancy 
from official figures.  We thus acknowledge the limitations to the accuracy of our measures. 
Conclusion 
We investigate the COVID-19 outbreak related clinical operations in Wuhan by drawing 
a timeline of the COVID-19 outbreak before lockdown, focusing on “human to human 
transmission.”  This timeline demonstrates that the Chinese government did not provide critical 
information it possessed of human to human transmission for at least three weeks, while 
intervening in the case reporting.  Without the three-week delay, the largest public health crisis 
of this century could have been avoided or controlled to a much greater degree.     
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Figures legends: 
Figure 1. Brief timeline of COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, China, before lockdown on January 
23, 2020, emphasizing events related “human to human transmission” . 
Figure 2. Calculation of R0 based on dataset A up to January 8, 2020. 
Figure 3A: Estimation of COVID-19 Infection with Intervention Taken on Jan 23, 2020. 
Figure 3B: Estimation of Infection with Intervention Taken on Jan 2, 2020. 
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Table 1. Evidence of “human to human” transmission in Wuhan, China, by December-31, 2019 
[20,21] 
 
Hospital Case Dates 
Xinhua Hospital The case of family of 3 Dec 27 and 28, 2019 
Central Hospital Sequencing result of “Bat 
SARS like” novel coronavirus 
reported by Guang Zhou 
(Vision Medical) from patient 
A (Dec-18-2019) 
Admitted on Dec 18, 2019; 
Sampled on Dec 24, 2019; 
Sequencing result reported on 
December 30, 2019 
Central Hospital The case of mother-son pair  December 29, 2019 
Central Hospital Beijing (CapitalBio MedLab) 
reported sequencing results of 
patient Chen 2 as “highly 
suspicious for SARS”.  
Admitted on December 27, 
2019; 
Reported on December 30, 
2019 
Xinhua Hospital One physician in Xinhua 
Hospital reported symptoms. 
This was confirmed on Jan 
11, 2020 and she is the 2nd 
case of medical staff infection 
in Xinhua Hospital. 
December 30, 2019 
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Table 2: R0 estimation 
 
Dataset A: PCR Incidence 
(December 1, 2019 - January 21, 2020) 
1.62 (1.53, 1.72) 
Dataset A: PCR Incidence 
(December 1, 2019 – January 8, 2020) 
3.12 (2.69, 3.64) 
Dataset B: Hospitalized 
(December 1,  2019 – January 21, 2020) 
2.28 ( 2.16, 2.41) 
Dataset C: CT 
(January 1,  2020 – January 21, 2020) 
3.70 (3.36, 4.06) 
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Table 3: Infection of COVID-19 from Wuhan on January 23, 2020 
R0 Intervention Latent  (incubation) Infectious  
Infected but no 
longer infectious  Recovered Died Total infected 
Total infected 
staying Wuhan 
Total infected 
out of Wuhan 
3.12 
(2.69, 3.64) 
January 23, 
2020 
114,823 
(15,935, 900,700)  
34,347 
(5,021, 272,953)  
71,193 
(12,423, 501,280) 
19,101 
(3,796, 129,551) 
411 
(81, 2,608) 
 239,875 
(37,256, 1,807,092)  
 154,205 
(23,950, 
1,161,702)  
 85,670 
(13,306, 645,390)  
3.12 
(2.69, 3.64) January 2, 2020 
1,333 
(258, 8,421) 
583 
(118, 3,508) 
5,807 
(1,536, 26,879) 
3,199 
(910, 13,639) 
67 
(19, 286) 
 10,989 
(2,841, 52,724)  
 7,064 
(1,826, 33,894)  
 3,925 
(1,015, 18,830)  
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Figure 1. Brief timeline of COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, China, before lockdown on January 23, 
2020, emphasizing events related “human to human transmission.” 
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Figure 2. Calculation of R0 based on dataset A up to January 8, 2020. 
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Note: calculation was done with the epidemic calculator. http://gabgoh.github.io/COVID/index.html 
Figure 3A: Estimation of COVID-19 Infection with Intervention Taken on Jan 23, 2020. 
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Note: calculation was done with the epidemic calculator. http://gabgoh.github.io/COVID/index.html 
Figure 3B: Estimation of Infection with Intervention Taken on Jan 2, 2020.  
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Appendix A. Data 
A B C D E F G H I 
Date New 
Confirme
d 
Incidence 
by PCR 
[13,14] 
Hospitaliz
ed( new 
incidence) 
Inferred to 
be positive 
cases [15-
19] 
Hospitalizatio
n (new 
incidence) 
[including 
confirmed and 
inferred] 
Symptomati
c cases at 
Clinic 
(inferred to 
be positive 
for COVID) 
Total 
Confirme
d by PCR 
(total of 
Column B 
by date) 
Dataset A 
Total 
Hospitalize
d (total of 
column D 
by date) 
Dataset B 
CT 
Clinical 
diagnosis 
daily 
Incidenc
e 
Dataset 
C 
Total 
Sympto
matic 
cases at 
Clinic 
(inferred 
to be 
positive 
for 
COVID) 
12/1/2019 1  1  1 1   
12/10/2019 3  3  4 4   
12/15/2019 2  2  6 6   
12/17/2019 1  1  7 7   
12/18/2019 1  1  8 8   
12/19/2019 1  1  9 9   
12/20/2019 5  5  14 14   
12/21/2019 4  4  18 18   
12/22/2019 3  3  21 21   
12/23/2019 8  8  29 29   
12/24/2019 1  1  30 30   
12/25/2019 3  3  33 33   
12/26/2019 2  2  35 35   
12/27/2019 2  2  37 37   
12/29/2019 7 7 7  44 44   
12/31/2019 3  3  47 47   
1/1/2020 10  10  57 57 1  
1/2/2020 6  6  63 63 1  
1/3/2020 12  12  75 75 3  
1/4/2020 12  12  87 87 5  
1/5/2020 15  15  102 102 8  
1/6/2020 17  17  119 119 10  
1/7/2020 30  30  149 149 12  
1/8/2020 43 8 51  192 200 14  
1/9/2020 31 8 39  223 239 17  
1/10/2020 32 4 36  255 275 30  
1/11/2020 32  32  287 307 24  
1/12/2020 28 25 53  315 360 29  
1/13/2020 21 30 51  336 411 35  
1/14/2020 22 7 29  358 440 42  
1/15/2020 22  22  380 462 50  
1/16/2020 12 41 53  392 515 60  
1/17/2020 5  5  397 520 72  
1/18/2020 5  5  402 525 86  
1/19/2020 2  2  404 527 100  
1/20/2020 3 270 273  407 800 123  
1/21/2020 2  2 2255 409 802 143  
1/22/2020   854   1656 176  
1/23/2020  340 340 3711  1956   
1/24/2020         
1/25/2020         
1/26/2020        64960 
1/27/2020        75221 
1/28/2020        87484 
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Appendix B. 
Timeline of COVID-19 Outbreak in Wuhan, before Lockdown on Jan 23, 2020 
*Executive Summary* 
 
 This timeline attempts to be comprehensive, with the main focus on “human-to-human” 
transmission 
 By January 1, 2020, there had been convincing evidence of “human-to-human” 
transmission 
 On January 20, 2020, Chinese communist party (CCP) government admitted “human-to-
human” transmission including infection of medical staff 
 Between January 1 and January 20, CCP government had been hiding the epidemic 
related information, suppressing the spread of epidemic related information and denying 
“human-to-human” transmission 
 The delay of sharing with the world the true information related to the COVID-19 
outbreak in Wuhan, leading to the largest public health and humanity crisis of this 
century 
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Classification 
 
A: Category A described how different layers of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
government system use various strategies to hide the truth about Wuhan COVID-19 outbreak, 
including all measures and policies to suppress the right moves from the first line medical staff in 
Wuhan.  
 
B: Category B described how the front line medical staff and other health care related 
professionals reacted and found out about the truth, and how they tried to manage the outbreak 
while blowing whistles. 
 
Basically, the “human to human transmission” and “viral genome” are the key clues that we 
focus this timeline on.  
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Timeline 
September 18, 2019 (09/18/2019) 
A: Chinese media reported a drill in Wuhan Customs. One case scenario was a case of patient 
with acute respiratory distress in Wuhan Airport, from a flight entering China. The patient was 
later diagnosed as “novel coronavirus infection”. 
http://k.sina.com.cn/article_2000016880_7735d5f002000krlq.html 
11/17/2019 
B: According to South China Moring Post, China’s first confirmed Covid-19 case could be 
traced back to November 17, 2019. Government records suggest first person infected with new 
disease may have been a Hubei resident aged 55, but ‘patient zero’ has yet to be confirmed. 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-
covid-19-case-traced-back  
12/1/2019 
B: 1st recorded symptom onset of Wuhan virus patient was on 12/1/2019 from a paper Chinese 
medical expert published on <Lancet> with title of <Clinical features of patients infected with 
2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China>. 
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30183-5/fulltext  
12/12/2019 
B. Patient Huang, from the Seafood Wet market, presented to Wuhan Youfu Hospital which is 
about 200 meters from the Wet Market. Huang mentioned that seven to eight staff in his 
neighbor store got sick, with fever. Huang was concerned about himself. He did not follow 
doctor’s suggestion to take a CT. 
12/16/2019 
B. Seventy years old male, presented to Youfu Hospital, with fever for several days. He took a 
chest x-ray which appeared no obvious abnormality. 
(八点健闻） 
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12/16/2019 
B. Patient A: Sixty-five years old, working as a delivery man in the Wet Market, presented to 
Wuhan Central Hospital, mentioning that he had persistent fever since Dec 13 (another saying 
Dec 15).  
12/18/2019 
B: Patient A with fever (same as above 12/16/19) presented to the ER of Wuhan Central 
Hospital. ER chief is Dr. Ai Fen. CT scan showed pulmonary infection with presentation of 
“multiple patchy blurry shadows in bilateral lungs''. This patient was transferred to ICU and did 
not respond to multiple antibiotics. Bronchoalveolar lavage was performed on 12/24/2019 and 
samples sent to 3rd party diagnostics company Vision Medicals (广州微远基因科技有限公司) 
at Guangzhou for (NGS/mNGS) sequencing. Patient A was transferred to Wuhan Tongji 
Hospital on Dec 25. 
12/26/2019 
B: Patient Chen1 visited Wuhan Central Hospital. Alveolar lavage sample was sent to Shanghai 
Public Health Clinical Center affiliated to Fudan University. 
12/26/2019 
B: Prof. Zhang Yongzhen’s team in Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center received one sample 
each from Wuhan Central Hospital and Wuhan CDC, respectively.  
[[[ From Wuhan Xinhua Hospital to Jinyintan Hospital: Series of events from 12/26-29, 
2019 
(for the purpose of coherence, a few day’s actions are put together): 
12/26/2019 
B: One patient from the Wet Market presented to Wuhan Xinhua Hospital. His symptoms 
included fever, cough, short of breath and “patchy ground glass” like lesions in the lungs.  
12/27/2019  
B: An elderly couple presented with Fever and dyspnea was admitted to Wuhan Xinhua Hospital 
ICU. ICU chief, Dr. Zhang Jixian reported these 3 similar cases to hospital leadership, hospital 
subsequently reported to local CDC in the morning. On 12/28/2019, the next day, son of the 
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above elderly couple was called to Xinhua Hospital. The CT imaging of all three showed similar 
findings. This family cluster demonstrated an obvious clue of “human to human 
transmission”.  
12/27/2019 
A: Local CDC came to Xinhua Hospital for epidemiological investigation in the afternoon and 
took history and samples from airway and blood. 
12/28 and 12/29, 2019 
B: There were another 3 patients with similar symptoms, all from the Wet Market.  
12/29/2019 
B: In the afternoon of 12/29, the vice president of Xinhua Hospital, Dr. Xia Wenguang, called 
for a clinical conference with 10 experts in different subspecialties for discussing these 7 
patients. All experts concurred that these represented unusual situations. Dr. Xia reported to the 
City and Provincial Health Commissions and CDCs. He asked for starting emergency 
protocol activation.  
A: In the same afternoon, Health commissions and CDCs from Wuhan City and Hubei Province 
organized an expert team to Xinhua Hospital.  
B. 6/7 patients in Xinhua Hospital were transferred to Wuhan Jinyintan Hospital.  
Patient A (the first one with sample submitted to NGS testing) from the Central also was 
transferred to Jinyintan Hospital.]]] 
12/27/2019 
B. Another patient (Chen2) presented to Wuhan Central Hospital. Alveolar lavage sample was 
sent to Beijing (CapitalBio MedLab, 北京博奥医学检验所有限公司) for NGS testing.  
12/27/2019 
B: The NGS sequencing results of patient A were orally reported back to Central Hospital by 
Vision Medicals by phone, it was claimed to be a coronavirus that is “Bat SARS like”. 
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12/27/2019 
B: Vice chief, Dr. Huang, of Jinyintan Hospital was told about patient A who was planned to be 
transferred to his hospital. Dr. Huang obtained sequencing results of patient A from Vision 
Medicals and forwarded to Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). WIV replied with confirmation 
of high similarity to SARS-like coronavirus from bat.  
12/29/2019 
B: ER in Wuhan Central Hospital reported 4 similar cases to Hospital Public Health Office, 
which reported to local county CDC. Among these 4 patients, there was a pair of mother-son, 
another example of human-to-human transmission.  
12/29/2019 
A: Local CDC and City Office arrived in Central hospital, surveyed and sampled the 7 patients.  
12/30/2019 
B:  Wuhan Jinyintan hospital sent samples from patients to Wuhan CDC and Wuhan Institute of 
Virology (WIV). 2 out of 7 samples were identified to be SARS positive by Wuhan Institute of 
Virology on 12/30/2019. 
12/30/2019 
B: Wuhan Jinyintan Hospital received another 27 patients, with 13 as “severe”. Regular floor 
wards were changed to “Quarantine wards”.  
12/30/2019 
B: Beijing CapitalBio MedLab (北京博奥医学检验所) reported sequencing results of 
patient chen 2 as “highly suspicious for SARS”, to the Central Hospital.  
12/30/2019 
B: Dr. Ai Fen, Chief in Central Hospital, reported sequencing result to Hospital Public Health 
Office and Hospital Infectious Disease Department. She also forwarded the report to ER doctor’s 
Wechat.  
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12/30/2019 
B: Dr.Li Wenliang from Wuhan central hospital shared information about SARS-like infection 
on Wechat and asked readers to warn family and friends. Dr. Liu and Dr. Xie also shared with 
their Wechat groups.  
12/30/2019 
Other whistle blower included Attending physician Dr. Xie Lingka in the Cancer Centerof Xiehe 
Hospital [（华中科技大学同济医学院附属）协和医院肿瘤中心主治医师谢琳卡].  
12/30/2019 
B: One physician in Xinhua Hospital reported symptoms. This was confirmed on Jan 11 and she 
is the 2nd case of medical staff infection in Xinhua Hospital.  
12/30/2019 
A: Wuhan City Health Commission issued 2 emergency policies, the 2nd one stated that “no one 
or institution is allowed to disclose information about the pneumonia without 
authorization.”  
12/30/2019 
A: Wuhan City Health Commission broadcasted to major hospitals internally that “1, this 
pneumonia is not SARS, 2 no human to human transmission, 3 does not cause death; 4 no 
medical staff infection”. (see above right) 
12/30/2019 
B: Wuhan Central Hospital clinical departments shared the message/instruction from Wuhan 
City Health Commission not to “casually announce the current situation to public or outsider, 
otherwise they would be seriously punished”. 
12/30/2019 
A: Leadership in Wuhan Central Hospital informed all division chiefs to inform their staff that 
they were not allowed to leak any virus related news and not allowed to wear facial masks.  
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12/31/2019 
A:  Chinese National Health Commission dispatched a panel of experts to Wuhan for 
investigation. Chinese CDC chief went to Wuhan on the earliest flight that day.  
12/31/2019 
B:  Zhongnan Hospital in Wuhan initiated a special team for “Pneumonia with unknown 
etiology”. The team leader asked all departments to prepare for infectious disease with human to 
human transmission potential but need to keep this confidential.  
12/31/2019 
B:  Xiehe hospital in Wuhan established 24 beds in an isolation unit for cares of “Pneumonia 
with unknown etiology” only, and organized re-distribution of resources including staff.  
12/31/2019 
A: Dr. Li Wenliang was called to hospital administration office for his mistake on spreading 
“rumors” and was asked to provide written statement for his “mistake”. 
12/31/2019 
A: Infectious control staff in PPE came to do cleaning in the Seafood Wet Market with sprayer.  
12/31/2019 
A: Wuhan media received messages that no reports were not allowed. They needed to follow 
official statements. 
12/31/2019 
A: Wuhan City Health Commission announced at 1:30 pm that recent pneumonia cases seen in 
some hospitals were related to the Wet Market; so far 27 cases were found,  with 7 severe cases, 
rest cases were stable, and 2 cases improved and would be discharged soon; investigation 
suggested above were viral pneumonia; so far no obvious findings of “human to human 
transmission” and no infection of medical staff.  
Note: For comparison (or see Table 3). 
12/31/2019 
A: China reported to WHO about a series of “Pneumonia with unknown etiology” in Wuhan.  
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12/31/2019 
B: Taiwan inquired China and WHO for more information about the outbreak, asking for details 
about the “Atypical Pneumonia” “patients quarantined”  with a strong suspicion of human to 
human transmission. Tianwan started border infectious screening on direct flights from Wuhan 
to Taiwan.  
12/31/2019 
Hong Kong media reported the presence of “new SARS” in Wuhan. Hong Kong government had 
press conference on the epidemic. They started almost daily press conference. 
1/1/2020 
B: A family clinic owner seeked medical care at Central hospital for pneumonia. ER chief Ai 
Fen contacted hospital for infection potential, her report was not answered. On the same day, she 
asked 200 ER staff to wear N95 masks, caps and wash hands. She also changed the surgical ward 
into an isolation unit with 20 beds.  
1/1/2020 
B. See Table 1. Summary: Evidence of “human to human transmission by 1/1/2020 
1/1/2020 
A:  Huanan seafood market was ordered by the Wuhan City government to be closed. 
1/1/2020 
A:  Chinese National Health Commission started a special team to manage the Wuhan outbreak 
with daily meetings. This was announced on 1/19/2020. 
1/1/2020 
B: Table 2. Marked increase of fever patients at new year of 2020.  
1/1/2020 
A: Table 3. Wuhan epidemiological data by 1/1/2020 
1/1/2020 
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A：An anonymous person in Sequencing Company reported that he received a phone call from 
Wuhan Health Commission on 1/1/2020 that he had to stop testing all samples from Wuhan; 
destroy all existing samples; should not disclose information regarding samples to public; should 
not publish any research or data based on the samples from Wuhan. He was told to report to the 
Health Commission should the company receive any sample in the future.  
1/1/2020 
A: Wuhan police department announced that Wuhan Health Commission has conveyed 
information about Wuhan pneumonia to the general public. However, some people spread 
false information online, 8 of them have been summoned and proper actions taken.  
1/1/2020 
A: The first edition of “Diagnosis and treatment manual for viral pneumonia of unknown 
etiology” was proposed and distributed to Wuhan.  
1/1/2020 
A: WIV conducted the separation of virus from sample(s) provided by Jinyintan Hospital. 
1/1/2020 
B: BGI group (Huada Gene) reported sequencing results of 3 cases of pneumonia which 
harboured a viral sequencing showing 80% similarity to SARS virus to Wuhan City Health 
Commission.  
1/2/2020 
A:  Wang Yanyi, Director of Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) emailed all staff to ensure they 
can not disclose any information about the new coronavirus.  
1/2/2020 
A： Dr. Ai Fen, ER chief in Wuhan Central Hospital, was seriously criticized by her superior at 
Central hospital for her “making rumors”, she needed to verbally tell all her 200 staff not to 
disclose anything about this pneumonia. She was also told she can not use Wechat or text but 
only by face to face or phone call. Dr. Ai raised the issue of “human to human transmission” and 
she received no response.  
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1/2/2020 
Wuhan Central Hospital leadership informed all staff, discussion of “pneumonia of unknown 
etiology” was not allowed except at the time of hands-off, any forms of documentation were not 
allowed. 
1/2/2020 
A: Wuhan Institute of Virology finished sequencing on 1/2/2020 of COVID-19, which was 
characterized as a “novel” coronavirus, the results were presented to GISAID on 1/11/2020 and 
publicized on 2/4/2020.  
1/2/2020 
A: CCTV13 aired the news that eight people in Wuhan were punished by “making and 
spreading rumors”.  
1/3/2020: 
A: Wuhan police had a meeting with Dr. Li Wenliang regarding his mistake of “spreading 
rumors”. (see below Admonition with his finger stamp): 
1/3/2020 
A: Central hospital administration (president, party secretary and party discipline commission 
secretary) criticized division chiefs for wearing masks. Anonymous physician mentioned that 
Dr.Li Wenliang was about to be fired by the hospital after he was reprimanded by the hospital 
admin. Hospital admin also issued commands verbally such as “can not tell”, “can not wear 
masks”. Hospital admin agreed for the ER, respiratory unit and ICU staff to wear N95 masks but 
asking other departments not to wear any masks, which lead to massive medical staff infection 
due to exposure to virus without protection in central hospital: Up to Feb-11, more than 230 
medical staff were diagnosed with COVID-19 infection and up to March-09, 4 physicians died, 
including Dr. Li Wenliang.  
1/3/2020 
A: Wuhan Health Commission : So far 44 cases with 11 severe cases. No evidence of “human 
to human transmission”, no infection of medical staff. 
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1/3/2020 
B: Wuhan reported pneumonia through an “online direct reporting system” for the first time to 
Chinese CDC. Chinese CDC former vice chief Yang Gongchuan stated that she asked the 
national CDC and confirmed that there was no “direct report” from Wuhan in 2019. Chinese 
CDC mentioned receiving a direct report from Wuhan from 1/3/2020 -1/10/2020, but reporting 
stopped suddenly till 1/24/2020.  
1/3/2020 
B: Chinese National Health Commission published 1st protocol for pneumonia with unknown 
viral etiology for Wuhan Health Commission to distribute.  
1/3/2020 
A: Wuhan Health Commission made 2 versions of the protocol with 2 covers. Protocol with 
Green cover has 9 files in it while the one with white cover has 10 files. Wuhan Health 
Commission distributed protocol with white cover with very strict diagnostic criterias. The green 
protocol was given to Chinese National Health Commission but the white protocol was used for 
medical practice in Wuhan. The fundamental difference is that “contact with Wuhan seafood wet 
market or contact history with suspected patients” is a must for diagnosis in the white protocol 
but optional in the green protocol. Following the white protocol will lead to massive 
underdiagnosis, under testing and under reporting.  
1/3/2020 
A: Chinese CDC Institute of Virology finished sequencing the whole genomic sequence for the 
novel coronavirus. This sequencing information were kept as secret. 
1/3/2020 
A: Chinese National Health Commission published “Document on 3” (or Prohibition on 3rd) 
on 1/3/2020 to prohibit any organization from publishing information about pathogen 
detection and test results, asking all organizations to destroy virus samples or transfer to 
designated institutions. Any organization of individuals that did not follow this policy will 
be legally punished.  
1/3/2020 
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A: Chinese government started to update the US government about outbreak information, but not 
to the Chinese public.  
1/4/2020 
Hong Kong government announced the eresponse plan for the novel infectious disease of public 
health significance.  
https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/govt_preparedness_and_response_plan_for_novel_infectious_
disease_of_public_health_significance_chi.pdf  
1/5/2020 
B: Professor Zhang Yongzhen team from Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center detected a 
novel SARS like coronavirus and obtained the whole genomic sequence from their samples 
obtained on 1/3/2020. Zhang notified Shanghai Health Commission and National  Health 
Commission to warn them that the new virus is in the same origin with SARS and spread 
from the respiratory tract and recommended disease control measures in public.  
1/6/2020 
A: One physician in the Pulmonary Medicine department has abnormal findings in his 
lungs in Wuhan Xinhua hospital. The hospital held an internal meeting which stressed that it 
was not allowed to leak this information out especially “can not tell the media”.   
1/6/2020 
A: Wuhan “Two sessions” started. No public media updated the public about the outbreak. 
1/6/2020 
A:  Chinese National CDC started 2nd degree emergency response internally.  
1/7/2020 
Chinese President Xi asked that the anti-epidemic measures should not affect normal life. 
http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-02/15/c_1125572832.htm 
1/9/2020 
A: Insider reported to Caixin Media that Zhongnan Hospital public health department submitted 
2 pneumonia cases on 1/9/2020 with direct reporting system to Chinese National CDC and 
had system confirmation of successful submission. However, they found that the submission 
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on 1/9/2020 was deleted. Wuhan CDC staff confirmed with Caixin Media that the Health 
Commission and CDC on district, city and province levels can see submission of cases from 
local hospitals in the system but district and city level do not have the authorization to delete 
them. 
1/9/2020 
In Hong Kong, experts assumed that the epidemic could have “human to human transmission”.  
1/10/2020: 
A: Wuhan “Two sessions“ ended, no information of the epidemic was discussed at the 
conference. 
A: Wuhan Health Commission announced its 1st epidemic report. It mentioned that no new 
cases were identified since 1/3/2020. No evidence for human to human transmission and no 
medical staff was infected.  
A: Dr. Wang Guangfa, expert team member for the National Health Commission, said that the 
outbreak is controllable when interviewed.  
1/10/2020 
B: Radiologist, Dr. Li at Wuhan Xinhua hospital identified 3 cases from CT reports with ground-
glass opacity. Similar cases increase daily with an exponential manner. There were 30 cases on 
1/10/2020. Dr. Li believed that situation was severe since he had never seen any virus that grows 
this fast and multiplied every few days. Dr.Li stopped believing official reports and contacted his 
peers from other radiology departments, the situations are not optimistic across hospitals.   
1/11/2020 
B Prof. Zhang Yongzhen's team from the lab of Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center 
published the genetic sequence of COVID-19 to GISAID and used GISAID、
virological.org and GenBank to share with the world at 9am on 1/11/2020. Chinese National 
Health Commission announced that China will share the virus genetic sequence with WHO that 
evening.  
1/11/2020 
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A：Chinese National Health Commission published other 5 genetic sequences from different 
patients, those 5 sequences are from Chinese CDC, Chinese medical science institute and Wuhan 
Institute of Virology. (Wuhan Institute of Virology confirmed the sequence on 1/2/2020 but 
upload on 1/11/2020 to GISAID.) 
1/11/2020 
Publication on NEJM indicated that there were 7 medical staff infected during Jan1-11, 2020. 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2001316 
1/12/2020 
A: Shanghai Health Commission ordered the lab (Prof. Zhang Yongzhen) in Shanghai Public 
Health Clinical Center, who submitted viral genome sequence to GISAIDon 1/11/2020,  to close 
down and subject to disciplinary actions, as the consequence of violating the “3rd Document” 
(or Prohibition on 3rd) issued on 1/3/2020.  
1/12/2020 
A: Wuhan CCP secretary, Ma Guoqiang stated on CCTV interview on 1/31/2020 that Wuhan 
had an increase in pneumonia cases on 1/12 and 1/13. Thus Wuhan started to measure passenger 
temperatures at airports and high-speed train stations.  
1/12/2020 
A: The reporting for pneumonia cannot be submitted without approval from Hubei Health 
Commission, thus reporting was artificially stopped from local hospitals for 5 days. 
1/14/202  
A: Director of Chinese National Health Commission had video conference with provincial 
directors.  
1/15/2020 
A: Chinese National Health Commission held video conferences on prevention and control of the 
epidemic. Exposed internal confidential documents (see below link) revealed that the meeting 
conveyed five messages: 1). Alarm of the epidemics. 2). Policy is “keep tension internally and 
keep a relaxed appearance to public”. 3). Prepare for the epidemic. 4). Ensure the strict 
procedure for diagnosis of first case to be followed, i.e., the first case can only be made by the 
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national level and announced by the province level. 5). Reduce the fatality rate since death would 
lead to public panic.  
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/20/6/2/n12156428.htm 
 1/17/2020 
B: Dr. Yuen Kwok-yung, a Hong Kong microbiologist, visited Wuhan with a panel of experts. 
Yuen felt the places he visited were all prepared for the Q&A sessions. Yuen later asked 
Guangdong CDC to prepare for human to human transmissions. Chief of Zhongnan hospital 
ICU protested to the expert panel that “the diagnostic criteria were too strict and will omit true 
patients. ” 
 1/18/2020 
A: Wuhan Health Commission reported 4 new cases. However, it reported no new cases from 
1/12-1/17. Multiple hospitals had the same experience of not being able to report during this 
period.   
1/18/2020 
B: Wuhan community organized group dinner event - “Ten-thousand families dinner” in which 
forty-thousand families participated. 
1/19/2020 
A:  Wuhan CDC and government stated to the media that Wuhan novel coronavirus had low 
infectivity and can be controlled and prevented.  
1/19/2020 
B： Dr. Li observed in the reading room that “in the beginning there were 2-3 cases daily,  4-5 
cases on day 2, 7-8 cases on day 3, there was no obvious growth in the first 3 days. Then it 
entered an exponential growth phase, about 30 cases on 1/10 then doubled every 3-4 days, 86 
cases on 1/18 then above 100 everyday afterwards.   
 1/20/2020 
 B:  Jinyintan, Hankou and Wuhan Pulmonary hospital became 3 designated hospitals for 
pneumonia with a total of 800 beds created. Other hospitals provided 1,200 beds, however the 
2,000 beds were soon all occupied.  
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A: Dr. Zhong Nanshan confirmed “human – to – human” transmission and infection of 
health care professionals at the press conference.  
1/21/2020 
Wuhan Health Commission announced the infection of 15 medical staff.  
1/22/2020 
A: Chinese National Health Commission reported that there was human to human 
transmission and infection of medical staff, source of virus and how virus spread was not 
identified.  
1/22/2020 
A: Gao Fu, director of Chinese CDC, commented in press conference that the origin of the 
epidemic was wild animals.  
1/22/2020 
B: Fever clinic visits for Red Cross hospital reached 1,700 on 1/22/2020 given the majority of 
hospitals closed their fever clinics on that day . Visits reached 2,400 the day after at that hospital.  
1/23/2020 
A: Lockdown of Wuhan was announced. Five million Wuhan residents left Wuhan before 
lockdown. 
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Appendix B. 
Table 1. Summary: Evidence of “human to human transmission by 1/1/2020 
Hospital Case Dates Action Reference 
/media 
reports 
Xinhua 
Hospital 
The case of family 
of 3 
Dec 27 and 28, 2019, in 
addition to the 4 cases 
from the Wet Market 
(total 7) 
Hospital reported to 
District CDC 
12/27/19; 
[1] 
Central 
Hospital 
Sequencing result of 
“Bat SARS like” 
novel coronavirus 
reported by Guang 
Zhou (Vision 
Medical) from 
patient A (Dec-18-
2019) 
Admitted on Dec 18, 
2019; 
Sampled on Dec 24, 
2019; Sequencing result 
reported on December 30, 
2019 
 [2] 
Central 
Hospital 
The case of mother-
son pair  
December 29, 2019  [2] 
Central 
Hospital 
Beijing (CapitalBio 
MedLab) reported 
sequencing results 
of patient Chen 2 as 
“highly suspicious 
for SARS”.  
Admitted on December 
27, 2019; 
Reported on December 
30, 2019 
 [3], [4] 
Xinhua 
Hospital 
One physician in 
Xinhua Hospital 
reported symptoms. 
December 30, 2019 Xinhua Hospital  
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This was confirmed 
on Jan 11, 2020 and 
she is the 2nd case 
of medical staff 
infection in Xinhua 
Hospital. 
Central 
Hospital 
A patient who was 
the owner of a 
family clinic at the 
Wet Market  
Jan 1, 2020  [2] 
Summary of 
sequencing 
results 
By December 30, 2019, samples were taken from no less than 9 patients 
of “pneumonia of unknown etiology” in Wuhan, including 6 from the 
Xinhua Hospital. Sequencing results suggested that the pathogen is a 
SARS-like coronavirus. These results were reported back to hospitals 
and reported to Health Commission and CDC.  
[4] 
 
Note: 
[1]. 应述辉, 毛旭. 健康报】张继先：最早发现了这不㇐样的肺炎. 2020-02-06. 
http://wjw.hubei.gov.cn/bmdt/ztzl/fkxxgzbdgrfyyq/yxdx/202002/t20200206_2020334.shtml 
[2]. 杜玮 中国新闻周刊: 武汉市中心医院医护人员被感染始末. FEB 17. 
https://medium.com/coronavirus19/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E6%96%B0%E9%97%BB%E5%91
%A8%E5%88%8A-
%E6%AD%A6%E6%B1%89%E5%B8%82%E4%B8%AD%E5%BF%83%E5%8C%BB%E9%99%A2
%E5%8C%BB%E6%8A%A4%E4%BA%BA%E5%91%98%E8%A2%AB%E6%84%9F%E6%9F%93
%E5%A7%8B%E6%9C%AB-106e63008271 
[3]. 武汉肺炎为何大爆发？财新网踢爆"最高密令" 
http://news.creaders.net/china/2020/02/29/2196390.html 
[4].  高昱等. 新冠病毒基因测序溯源：警报是何时拉响的》《财新网》2月26日. Article deleted.  
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Appendix B 
Table 2. Wuhan epidemiological data by 1/1/2020 according to different resources 
Presenter Nov-17-19 Dec-
1-19 
Dec-8-19 Dec-
31-19 
Jan-1-
20 
Methods  Note 
Wuhan Health 
Commission  
 
  Frist case as 
announced on 
Jan-11-20. 
27  Official 
announcement  
 
Huang et al, 
Lancet 
 1  41   [1] 
Epidemiology 
Working Group 
for NCIP 
Epidemic 
Response, 
Chinese Center 
for 
   104  Extracted from 
China's Infectious 
Disease 
Information 
System. 
[2] 
South China 
Morning Post 
First case of 
COVID-19 
confirmed 
case can be 
traced back 
to this day.  
27 by Dec-15, 60 by 
Dec-20, 180 by Dec-27, 
2019. 
266 381 Internal data from 
Chinese 
government 
[3] 
Li Q et al    47  “pneumonia of 
unknown etiology” 
surveillance 
mechanism 
[4] 
Note: 
[1]. https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30183-5/fulltext 
[2]. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32064853/ 
[3]. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-
confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back 
[4]. https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2001316  
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Table 3. Early sequencing of viral genomes by different labs 
 
Sequencing lab Patient Hospital Note 
Vision Medical, (广
州微远基因科技有
限公司) Guang Zhou; 
Collaborator is 
Chinese Medical 
Science Academy 
Institute of Virology 
[1]  
Patient A Wuhan Central 
Hospital. Admitted on 
Dec 18, 2019; 
Sampled on Dec 24, 
2019; Sequencing 
result reported on 
December 30, 2019 
“Bat SARS like” 
novel coronavirus. 
Collaborator is 
Chinese Medical 
Science Academy 
Institute of Virology 
which submitted the 
sequence to GISAID 
in the evening on 
1/11/20. 
Beijing (CapitalBio 
MedLab) [2] 
Patient Chen 2  Wuhan Central 
Hospital. 
Admitted on 
December 27, 2019; 
Reported on 
December 30, 2019 
reported sequencing 
results of as “highly 
suspicious for 
SARS”.  
Shanghai Public 
Health Clinical 
Center affiliated to 
Fudan University [3] 
Patient Chen 1 Wuhan Central 
Hospital.  
Sequencing finished 
on 1/5/20. 
First lab submitted 
COVID-19 sequence 
to GISAID at 9 am on 
1/11/20. Lab was 
suspended on 
1/12/20.  
Wuhan Institute of 
Virology, Chinese 
Science Academy [4] 
 Sampled on 
December 30, 2019, 
Jinyintan Hospital 
Finished viral 
genome sequencing 
on 1/2/20; submitted 
to GISAID on 
1/11/20 and made 
public on 2/4/20. 
BGI groups [5] 3 positive samples 
from 30 samples from 
Wuhan in December, 
2019 
Multiple hospitals 
3 positive samples 
received on 12/16, 
12/29 and 12/30 
3 positive cases 
showing high 
similarity to SARS (> 
80%); SARS testing 
kit negative;  reported 
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to Wuhan Health 
Commission on 
1/1/2020; whole 
genome sequencing 
on 1/3/2020. 
Chinese CDC [6] Finished sequencing 
on 1/3/20. 
Received 4 samples 
from Wuhan on 
1/2/2020. 
Viral genome 
sequence submitted to 
GISAID on 1/12/20.  
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